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MRS. PALSGRAF AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
FREDERICK SCHAUER*
Questions of causation lie not only at the heart of much of tort law,
but also at the heart of the first amendment. Given that it is far too late
in our experiential and scientific day to deny the extent to which commu-
nicative acts may cause legally cognizable injuries,' much that is important
and interesting about the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
pertains to the way in which the first amendment treats communicative
causes differently from noncommunicative causes. 2 It is that difference that
I want to explore in this brief paper. My thesis, quite simply, is that the
existence of a communicative cause is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for a first amendment-inspired modification of otherwise appli-
cable principles of tort law. Imposing a first amendment overlay on the
principles of tort law that would otherwise prevail is justifiable, I will urge,
when and only when communications of a certain sort are at issue. And as
with many other facets of first amendment inquiry, it appears that the most
important questions are not about what the first amendment does, but
about when the first amendment does whatever it is that it is going to do.
Especially with respect to questions of causation and tort law, threshold
and theory-laden questions of the coverage of the first amendment are
among the most important and intractable that we encounter.'
Let me begin with LeBoeuf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company.4 In
LeBoeuf one of the plaintiffs was a passenger in an automobile driven by
Shelby Leleux. At the 5:00 a.m. time of the accident, Leleux was driving
between 100 and 105 miles per hour, with a blood alcohol level of .18%
resulting from his steady drinking since 9:00 p.m. the previous night.
Subsequent examination of the automobile, a new Mercury Cougar with a
460 cubic-inch, 425 horsepower engine, revealed that the separation of a
tire tread from the carcass of an HR-78-15 Goodyear custom power radial
tire precipitated the accident. When the passenger brought suit against
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. For an extended discussion of my views about causation, see Schauer, Causation
Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 737.
2. I have learned much from Judy Lachman's unpublished work, A Theory of Causation
in the Context of Speech-Related Harm, or When Does Speech Cause Harm?. See also
Lachman, Reputation and Risktaking, in THE CosT OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLI-
CATIONS 229 (E. Dennis & E. Noam eds. 1989).
3. On the distinction between coverage and protection that guides but is not reexplained
in this paper, see F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PmOSOPmCA ENQUIRY 89-92 (1982); Schauer,
Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 285; Schauer,
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. RPv. 265 (1981).
4. 451 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. La. 1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Goodyear and Ford,5 the two defendants responded, naturally enough, by
asserting that the act of driving in excess of 100 miles per hour by a highly
intoxicated driver constituted the proximate cause of the accident, and that
the existence of this "intervening" misuse of the product relieved them
from liability. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
however, applying Louisiana law, concluded that this case fell within the
category of reasonably foreseeable misuse and upheld a verdict for the
plaintiffs, 6 thus allowing liability against the manufacturer even though the
driver had not used the product in the normal and proper way.
Although not every court would necessarily decide LeBoeuf the same
way, the decision hardly falls outside of the existing boundaries of contem-
porary American tort law. 7 By focusing on foreseeability, and by refusing
to limit liability to the most temporally immediate negligent causal agent,
the court reached a result that has ample support both in the case law and
in the voluminous literature on causation and negligence.
Now let me compare a quite different case, one I want to create rather
than describe, but one I will create around the facts of Brandenburg v.
Ohio.8 In Brandenburg the speaker was a Ku Klux Klan leader who delivered
an inflammatory speech representing that "revengeance" against Blacks and
Jews was likely to occur unless there were drastic changes in governmental
policy-changes designed to preserve Brandenburg's view of the appropriate
primacy of "the white, Caucasian race." Brandenburg was prosecuted and
convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute. The Supreme Court,
however, overturned the conviction, holding that a prosecution based on
the potential connection between a speech and an ensuing unlawful act
inspired by that speech could be maintained only "where ... advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action." This standard persists to this day, 9 and
represents the current articulation of the "clear and present danger" prin-
ciple that has been with us since the early part of the century.' 0
5. LeBoeuf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985, 987 (5th Cir. 1980). The
driver of the car was killed in the accident, and his mother's wrongful death action was
consolidated with the action brought by the passenger.
6. Id. at 988-90. The Fifth Circuit determined that the defenses of assumption of risk
and contributory negligence were properly rejected by the trial court on the evidence.
7. See, e.g., Back v. Wilkes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 641, 378 N.E.2d 964, 969-70 (1978);
Beatty v. Schramny, Inc., 188 N.J. Super. 587, 592, 458 A.2d 127, 129 (App. Div. 1983). See
generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 197-203, 303-06 (5th ed. 1984); M. SEEu'o, THE LAW OF PRODucTs LiAnmrry
21.01 et seq. (1987).
8. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
9. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), reh'g denied,
459 U.S. 898 (1982).
10. Brandenburg is commonly taken to combine the more speech-protective components
of Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961), Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961),
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring), Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
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Now suppose that one of Brandenburg's listeners, convinced of the
wisdom of Brandenburg's message but believing that immediate action was
necessary, proceeded to commit a battery on some Black or Jew. And
suppose also that the victim of the battery discovers that Brandenburg's
pockets were deeper than those of the actual wielder of the axe handle, and
accordingly she sues Brandenburg for having negligently caused her injury.
Acknowledging (for the sake of argument, or for lack of proof) that
Brandenburg had no more desired her injury than Goodyear or Ford had
desired that of the passenger in LeBoeuf, she still maintains that the actual
perpetrator of the battery had engaged in a foreseeable misuse of Branden-
burg's message in exactly the same way that the driver in LeBoeuf had
engaged in a foreseeable misuse of Goodyear's tires. If she can establish
the causal connection between the speaker's speech and the battery, similar
to the causal connection established in LeBoeuf between Goodyear and the
disintegration of the tire at 100 miles per hour, she maintains, then she
should be allowed to recover. Consequently, she offers proof from the
assailant himself that but for Brandenburg's speech, the assailant would
never have thought of battering her."
Both accepted wisdom and a fair reading of Brandenburg indicate that
the first amendment would not permit the imposition of liability in these
circumstances. 12 Given that the difference between tort liability and criminal
punishment is normally of no first amendment significance, 3 to attach
dissenting), Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), and Masses Publishing Co. v.
Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (L. Hand, J.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (1917). See generally
Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Frag-
ments of History, 27 STN. L. Ray. 719 (1975).
11. The statement in the text is hardly fanciful, for it is exactly this kind of proof,
usually in the form of an identity between a published description and the act performed, that
undergirds a number of recent cases. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F.
Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983), motion to dismiss denied, 583 F. Supp. 1566 (S.D. Tex. 1984),
rev'd, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988) (deceased teenager
found hanged next to copy of Hustler Magazine article describing practice of autoerotic
asphyxiation); Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Sys., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr.
888 (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982) (rape committed in exactly the same manner as
one described on television show); Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402,
276 S.E.2d 580 (1981) (child testified to following instructions on television show regarding
how to create a sound effect with a BB and a balloon).
12. All of the cases cited supra note 11 relied on Brandenburg to deny liability. See
generally Diamond & Primm, Rediscovering Traditional Tort Typologies to Determine Media
Liability for Physical Injuries: From the Mickey Mouse Club to Hustler Magazine, 10 HASTINGs
COMMENT L.J. 969 (1988); Kopech, Shouting "INCITEMENT!" in the Courtroom: An
Evolving Theory of Civil Liability?, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 173 (1987).
13. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also American Booksellers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), reh'g denied,
475 U.S. 1132 (1986) (evaluating civil remedy under same standards applicable to criminal
prosecution). Although the existing law on this point is moderately clear, there exists little
articulated justification for treating a state's provision of a tort remedy, especially between
nongovernmental parties, in exactly the same way that the first amendment treats a criminal
prosecution or any other restricting action performed by governmental officials. See Schauer,
The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAIn. L. Rv. 761 (1986).
1990]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:161
liability in these circumstances would be impermissible, in part because
Brandenburg's speech did not explicitly incite the action that occurred, in
part because the ensuing battery was not "imminent,' 4 and perhaps in
part because the tort standard of foreseeability allows a lower probability
of occurrence than allowed by the Brandenburg idea of "likelihood."
Thus it appears that the bite of the first amendment consists of the
way in which the very same showing of cause in fact and reasonable
foreseeability that would be sufficient for normal tort purposes is insufficient
where the link in the causal chain that is the subject of liability is an act
of communication, as in Brandenburg. Although both the driver in LeBoeuf
and the assailant in my modified version of Brandenburg are clearly liable,
the first amendment, and only the first amendment, appears to explain why
Goodyear and Ford are liable in the first case but Brandenburg is not liable
in the second.
This all seems commonplace, and indeed explains the results in a number
of widely discussed cases, such as Olivia N. v. NBC" and Herceg v. Hustler
Magazine.'6 In both of these cases the nature of the proximate act, the rape
in Olivia N. and the autoerotic asphyxiation in Herceg, was sufficiently
similar to the act described in the publication and sufficiently unlikely to
have been inspired by any other source that the threshold question of cause
in fact was satisfied. But like my hypothetical variation on Brandenburg,
in both cases the absence of explicit incitement, 17 imminence, and whatever
Brandenburg means by likelihood was sufficient to eliminate liability for
the publications at issue, however much the facts and the proof appear
structurally similar to the facts that rendered the analogous Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Company liable in LeBoeuf.
But now let me complicate things. Suppose that a manufacturer of
chainsaws enclosed accompanying instructions explaining, inter alia, how to
remove the numerous safety devices and operate the chainsaw without them,
but explaining also that these devices were to be removed only by a trained
mechanic for testing purposes after a repair. Suppose further that it is easier
and faster to operate a chainsaw without the safety devices, and that most
regular users of chainsaws are aware of this fact. Now suppose also that
some consumer removes the safety devices, causing personal injury to both
himself and a bystander,' The consumer and the bystander sue the chainsaw
14. On imminence, see Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
15. 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1987).
16. 814 F,2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 US. 959 (1988).
17. Unlike Olivia N., the communication in Herceg involved a specific warning not to
engage in the practice. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (8th Cir. 1987).
Quaere whether the warning increased or decreased the likelihood that a fourteen year old
male would commit the act.
18. The presence of the injured third party, whether the victim of the rape in Olivia N.,
the victim of the battery in my hypothetical variant on Brandenburg, or the bystander here,
removes potential contributory negligence complications and thus focuses more cleanly on the
causation issue. In this respect, it is true afortiori that an injured bystander or other driver
would have been able to recover in LeBoeuf.
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manufacturer, citing the LeBoeuf line of cases. Moreover, they prove that
but for the instructions the safety devices would never have been removed,
and that but for the removal of the safety devices the accident would never
have occurred. They argue foreseeable misuse, supporting foreseeability with
proof of the general patterns of chainsaw usage. The chainsaw manufacturer,
however, responds by citing Brandenburg, Olivia N., and Herceg for the
proposition that the relevant link in the causal chain, the instruction booklet,
was an act of communication protected by the first amendment just like
Brandenburg's speech, NBC's television show, and Hustler's publication of
its magazine. Accordingly, the manufacturer argues that speaker liability
may be imposed only if the Brandenburg standards are met. Because the
chainsaw manufacturer as publisher and distributor of the instructions (that
is, as speaker) neither desired nor urged the injury, and because the
imminence and likelihood were no greater than in Olivia N. and Herceg,
the manufacturer argues that this variety of "secondary" liability (the
bystander could of course sue the chainsaw operator, just as Olivia N.
could sue the rapist) cannot be imposed consistent with the first amend-
ment.19
Our first reaction is one of disbelief. We raise our eyebrows and snicker,
but then we realize that the defendant is serious. The chainsaw manufacturer
is not kidding! What do we say? Assuming the identical probability,
consequences, and foreseeability in fact in this case as in my modified
Brandenburg case, and assuming the same proof of causation in fact, what
explains the difference? Both involve the same proof of causation and
foreseeability, both involve the same amount of negligence in a "reasonable
man" sense, and both involve negligence in the course of a communicative
act. What explains the difference?
One approach, of course, is to say that there is no difference. The
chainsaw manufacturer has got us. If communication is all that important,
then we ought to factor that importance into the creation of liability rules,
which means two things. First, determining causation is an attributive
process that involves finding causation with respect to some but not other
logically equivalent causal agents on the basis of a variety of policy consid-
erations;20 it is appropriate, therefore, to factor the value of communication
19. Actually, the issue of likelihood is more complicated than I suggest in the text. Given
the number of copies of Hustler that are published, and given the number that end up in the
hands of male adolescents (a fact that presumably could be proved at trial), it is possibly
"likely" ex ante that an autoerotic death was going to occur, although not likely that any
particular death (that is, to a particular person reading a particular copy of the magazine) was
going to occur. The same reasoning presumably would apply to my hypothetical chainsaw
instructions. To the best of my knowledge, there are no judicial opinions dealing with this
complication of the Brandenburg likelihood test.
20. See Lachman, supra note 2; Schauer, supra note 1, at 737. See generally Calabresi,
Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. COn. L.
Rav. 69 (1975); Landes & Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983); Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the
Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980).
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into that determination, thus finding that only the user of the chainsaw and
not the creator of the instructions for its [mis]use is causally responsible
for any ensuing injuries. And second, even if some cases exist in which
there may be no ascertainable responsible agent, that is but one more
manifestation of the fact that the first amendment often and properly
protects harmful speech despite the harm it may cause. The results in the
Skokie cases, 21 in Hudnut v. American Booksellers Association, Inc.,22 and
in Brandenburg itself, as well as the results in cases like Olivia N. and
Herceg, are ample testimony to the way in which the first amendment's
importance is manifested in its immunization of a great deal of harmful
speech from criminal or civil liability.
Yet this argument for not imposing liability on the chainsaw manufac-
turer (assuming the otherwise applicable tort principles would create such
liability) simply will not do. One need not be an ardent antifoundationalist
to accept the fact that if some principles generate results so at odds with
our basic understanding about, for example, the principle of freedom of
speech, and so contrary to results that we are willing to tolerate, then it is
time to reevaluate or refine the principle. This is little more than Rawlsian
reflective equilibrium in action.
Thus if something tells us that there is a difference between Branden-
burg's free speech claim and that of the chainsaw manufacturer, then we
must attempt another approach. We might try to draw analogies with
commercial speech doctrine and propose that although there is no mandate
for placing the chainsaw instructions totally outside the ambit of the first
amendment, various differences, both "commonsense" and theoretical,
indicate that the degree of first amendment protection in the two cases
ought to be dramatically different. 23
We could also make a claim (one more congenial to me as well as to
the existing case law), that the chainsaw case quite simply has nothing to
do with what the first amendment is all about, because the type of
communication has no relation to any purpose the first amendment purports
to serve. We would say not that instructions are less protected by the first
amendment (which would mean that every instruction case still must be
tested against a first amendment-inspired set of doctrinal rules) but that
they are not covered at all.
Although I have a preference for the second approach, I will not
rehearse here arguments I have made for it over the first.? Because whether
we adopt the first or the second, we are still distinguishing between the
cases based on our understanding of what is central to the first amendment,
and by contrast what is peripheral. But what are the bases for that
21. National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
22. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
23. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
24. See supra note 3.
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distinction? Clearly, answering this question is necessary, and encompasses
the totality of questions relating to first amendment high theory. I cannot
answer or even address those questions here, but I can point in several
directions.
One direction is to draw a distinction between something called the
"media" and other forms of communication. This distinction, with some
basis in the relevant tort law25 and some (to me not irrelevant) basis in the
text of the first amendment, 26 would distinguish otherwise identical com-
munications depending on whether they appeared in some item we think of
as the media or whether they surface in some other manner. This distinction
would be premised on something special about the media as a category,
even if like all categories this one is both under- and over-inclusive. But
this approach is in tension with some of the tort cases, in particular the
decisions holding advertisements to be indistinguishable from instructions
for tort purposes. 27 In addition, the approach is in tension with the Supreme
Court's unwillingness to draw this kind of line. For example, in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. n the Court faced the structurally
similar question of how to distinguish communications having little to do
with the first amendment (credit reports) from those in which the first
amendment is more centrally implicated, and the Court eschewed a media/
nonmedia distinction in favor of a distinction between matters of public
concern and matters of purely private concern.
Alternatively (and with some overlap), we are forced to draw some of
the implicit but rarely discussed distinctions that Kent Greenawalt has
explored in the relationship between the first amendment and the criminal
law.29 First, there is a distinction between the ideological and the self-
interested. Some communications are directed to social, cultural, economic,
political, moral, religious, or similar values, with the intention of contrib-
uting to a discussion of or decisions with respect to change in or retention
of those values. By contrast, other communications relate to the self-interest,
or private interest of only the speaker and hearer. Here we might draw, in
the criminal law, a distinction between "You ought to blow up the draft
board to help end an immoral war" and "You ought to blow up the bank,
take the money, and retire to the South of France." If the distinction
explains at least part of the rarely discussed tensions between a great deal
25. See Diamond & Prinm, supra note 12, at 969.
26. I refer here to the Press Clause, recognizing that the argument for treating this clause
as having independent significance has gotten nowhere in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
27. See, e.g., Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 514-15 (3d Cir. 1987); Weirum
v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 48, 539 P.2d 36, 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975).
28. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
29. K. GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND e USES OF LANGUAGE (1989); Greenawalt,
Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 119 (1989); Greenawalt, Speech and Crime,
Am. B. FouND. RES. J. 645 (1980); Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech,
78 Nw. U. L. Ray. 1081 (1983).
1990]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:161
of first amendment doctrine and the well-settled aspects of the criminal law,
then maybe the distinction is equally applicable to questions about the extent
to which the first amendment will intrude into areas of tort law traditionally
untouched by free speech concerns.
Second, there might be a distinction between the public and the private.
Here that distinction refers only to the difference between what is simul-
taneously broadcast to a large audience, whether by a speech, the mass
media, or a basement-printed brochure, and what is communicated person-
to-person and essentially face-to-face. Like any of these distinctions, this
one is not self-standing. No one would suggest that the first amendment
does not protect a political conversation between two people, or a request
to support a religious cause. Still, when we think about those factors that
mark the archetypal free speech setting, the attempt to persuade or to
inform large audiences stands in the foreground of our understanding.
Third, there is a distinction between argument and information. The
issue, which surrounds discussion of the Progressive case30 and the consti-
tutionality of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act31 as well as the lesser
degree of protection afforded commercial speech, can hardly be dispositive,
because it is obvious that conveying information is a very large part of
what the first amendment is all about. Still, insofar as factual information
is commonly verifiable in a way that normative argument is not, a distinction
between conveying factual, verifiable information and engaging in explicitly
normative argument is potentially relevant at the margins of first amendment
coverage.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there are inescapable determi-
nations that the first amendment is about certain topics and not about
others-that some forms of communication are central to a proper under-
standing of the first amendment and others are peripheral. Like any question
about coverage, this question cannot be answered or even addressed without
embracing the full range of both free speech and constitutional theory. That
is, we must first determine where to find the necessary account of what the
first amendment is all about. Depending on one's constitutional theory, that
determination might require looking to text, to original intent, to public
policy, or to something else. And if the constitutional theory is anything
other than an extremely narrow conception of original intent, then the
determination necessarily requires an examination of the policies and prin-
ciples that underlay the very idea of free speech. To say that this examination
cannot be accomplished here is an understatement, but pointing out the
way in which those decisions are necessarily on the agenda is a large part
of my message.
The result of these inquiries will not be any simple three-part test to
determine when the presence of a communicative act will implicate the first
amendment and when it will not. As with many distinctions, they are easier
30. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
31. 50 U.S.C. § 421 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
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to see at the poles than to apply to close cases in the middle.32 At the very
least, I mean to suggest that when an act of communication is directed at
a private transaction and not at social change, when it is delivered face to
face or individually rather than to the world at large, when it seeks to
convey information and not argument, and when it pertains only to topics
well beyond the range of topics perceived to involve the values of the first
amendment, then with the convergence of all four of these factors there
does not seem to be any reason to convert what would otherwise be a pure
tort action into anything else. Conversely, when the communication involved
is aimed at issues of public concern, is directed to a large audience, has
normative content, and pertains to the kinds of speech that the first
amendment intends to protect, then the fact that an action nominally sounds
in traditional tort language is no mandate for concluding that the first
amendment does not provide the driving engine in the analysis. Many cases
will of course fall in between, and in those cases the presence or absence
of the described factors together with the degree to which each is present
will be determinative in assessing whether or not the case is a first amend-
ment case.
My message is thus a simple one. The presence or absence of an act of
communication is both too under-inclusive and too over-inclusive of true
first amendment concerns to act as an effective surrogate for the presence
of those concerns. Although there is no reason to expect or desire that the
under- and over-inclusiveness can be totally eliminated,33 a recognition of
the fact that the first amendment is about both more than and less than
communication simpliciter is the first step toward recognizing that although
in some tort cases Brandenburg must be the lodestar, in others we will
continue to rely on the lessons we have learned from Mrs. Palsgraf.
32. See Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1985).
33. To eliminate the under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness of the category "speech,"
measured vis-a-vis the justifications for freedom of speech, would be to eliminate the idea of
freedom of speech entirely. Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 Wrm. & MARY L.
REv. 1 (1989).
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